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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
MICHAEL STEWARD, 
Defendant-Appellant• 
Case No. 900158-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of unlawful possession 
of marijuana with intent to distribute, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1990); and 
unlawful possession of methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990), as the appeal is from a 
district court in a criminal case not involving a conviction of a 
first degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court was correct in determining 
that the initial stop of defendant's vehicle was lawful. The 
standard for reviewing a trial court's legal conclusion regarding 
a motion to suppress is the correction of error standard. State 
v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, granted, 
P.2d (Utah 1989). 
2. Whether the trial court was correct in determining 
that the search of defendant and his vehicle was lawful. 
Defendant has not analyzed the legality of the search of his 
vehicle. This Court may decline to address issues which have not 
been properly analyzed and presented to it. State v. Amicone, 
689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). The standard of reviewing the 
court's decision on the search of defendant's person is the 
correction of error standard. State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 
327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, granted, P.2d (Utah 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 19, 1989, defendant was charged with 
unlawful possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1990), and unlawful possession of 
methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1990) (Record [hereafter R.] at 6-
7). Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from 
him "as a result of the stop of the defendant's vehicle and the 
search of said vehicle" (R. at 13). The motion to suppress was 
heard on January 2, 1990, and was denied (R. at 14 and 53 
[transcript of suppression hearing 1/2/90]). Findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and an order denying the motion were signed 
by the trial court after the trial (R. at 20-24). 
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The matter was tried to the bench on January 26, 1990, 
in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, the 
Honorable Michael R. Murphy, district judge, presiding (R. at 19, 
and 54 and 55 [transcripts of bench trial 1/26/90]). The court 
found defendant guilty of both charges (R. at 19 and 55). On 
March 5, 1990, defendant was sentenced to two consecutive terms 
of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison and fined. The 
prison terms were stayed and defendant placed on probation with 
certain conditions (R. at 31-33). A notice of appeal was filed 
on March 14, 1990, and an application for certificate of probable 
cause was denied by the trial court on March 29, 1990 (R. at 35-
49). This Court subsequently granted a certificate of probable 
cause and defendant's sentence has been stayed pending this 
appeal (R. at 50-52). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 20, 1989, members of the Metro Narcotics task 
force obtained search warrants for three houses in a cul-de-sac 
off Lead Mine Road in Bingham Canyon (R. 53 at 38 and R. 54 at 
25). There were three other houses in the cul-de-sac which had 
no involvement in the searches (R. 53 at 38). The Metro 
Narcotics team asked the Salt Lake City SWAT team to assist them 
in securing the area during the searches (R. 53 at 4). The SWAT 
team was asked to make the initial entry into the houses, then 
set up a perimeter around the search area for security (R. 53 at 
4-6). This request was based on the officers' knowledge that the 
houses probably contained a methamphetamine lab and that the 
presence of volatile substances used in making methamphetamine 
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was very likely (R. 53 at 11, and 36-41). The officers also were 
aware that there was a high likelihood of weapons in the houses 
(R. 53 at 37). 
The houses were entered and searched prior to 
defendant's arrival (R. 53 at 23). A functional methamphetamine 
lab and large packages of marijuana were found in one house and 
chemicals for preparing methamphetamine in another (R. 53 at 39-
40). Weapons such as handguns, shotguns, rifles, knives, and 
crossbows were found in all three houses (R. 53 at 39). Based on 
the discovery of these items, the officers' concern about the 
explosive nature of the chemicals used in making methamphetamine, 
the congested nature of the cul-de-sac with all of the police 
vehicles, and officer safety, the Metro officers directed the 
SWAT team to stop all vehicles entering the cul-de-sac and 
ascertain to which house they were en route (R. 53 at 8, 14, 22, 
and 40-41 and R. 54 at 6). 
The SWAT officers stopped all vehicles which turned 
into the cul-de-sac to determine their business and whether their 
occupants could be safely allowed into the cul-de-sac. If the 
occupant indicated that he or she was going to a house other than 
one being searched, the officers would escort him or her to the 
home (R. 54 at 6 and 18). If the driver indicated a destination 
which was one of the houses being searched, the officers held the 
person for the one to two minutes it took for a Metro detective 
to reach the stopped vehicle and check the identity of the 
visitor. Metro was looking for other individuals who were 
involved in the labs and whom they had seen while conducting 
surveillance (R. 54 at 19). 
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At approximately 11:50 p.m., defendan t turned h i s 
pickup into the cul-de-sac 53 at 12 and R. 54 at 5-7). The 
SWAT team oiiieers st,e . • c: I .he street and flagged him down, 
identifying themselves a^ police officers (R. 53 at 12 and 3] ai id 
R. 54 at 7, 14-15 and 21-22). Defendant stopped, then either 
quickly put his vehicle in .reverse or all owed it to roll backward 
down the slight grade (R. 53 at 12-13, 21, and 30 and P. *54 -,- 8 
and 16-17). Defendant looked "kind of panicky or startled" (R. 
53 at 13). One of the officers opened defendant's door and told 
him to stop, then asked him where he was going D " *+ 14 and 
R. 54 at 8). Defendant said he was visiting a friend at the end 
of the cul-de-sac, then gave tl le nan t.e of the occupant of one of 
the houses being searched (R, 53 at 15 and R. 54 at 9 and 20). 
The officers asked defendant to get out of the pickup, which he 
did. The officers patted defendant down dhd checked the ;ab of 
the pickup for weapons (R. 53 at 15 and 25-26 and R 54 at 9-10). 
Officer Adair, from t.he SWA'^ 1 t earn, shined his flashlight into the 
cab and saw an open blue gym bag on the floor on the passenger 
side. He also saw the tops of plastic baggies in the gym bag (R. 
53 at if . A5 officer Adair patted down 
defendant, other officers checked the cab for weapons (F it 
26). 
Vht.hin a niinuu1 nl hi ,. clefftmlani, the SWAT team 
officers radioed to Detective Huggard at the search site that 
i.hpv Ihi'ii stoppea a vehicle with suspected marijuana In It (R. 53 
at 4.1), Within five minutes of the repoi )el:ect.ive Hu'-iyard 
arrived at defendant's pickup and saw defendant standing outside 
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(R. 53 at 44 and R. 54 at 25). Detective Huggard looked into the 
passenger window of the pickup and saw the blue gym bag on the 
floor with plastic baggies of suspected marijuana inside; some of 
the baggies were hanging out of the gym bag (R. 53 at 42 and R. 
54 at 26-27). The detective retrieved the gym bag, which 
contained four baggies with suspected marijuana and numerous 
empty baggies (R. 54 at 27). Detective Huggard placed defendant 
under arrest (R. 53 at 42). 
Detective Huggard picked up a leather jacket from the 
seat of the pickup, intending to give it to defendant to put on 
because it was a cool evening and the officers were going to take 
defendant to one of the houses (R. 53 at 43 and R. 54 at 29). 
Defendant indicated that the jacket was his (R. 53 at 43 at R. 54 
at 29). Detective Huggard checked the jacket for weapons and 
felt a package which he pulled out to check for a gun. The 
package turned out to be a wallet with $4,000.00 and a bindle of 
white, powdery substance (R. 53 at 43 and R. 54 at 29-30). The 
money was broken down into forty $100.00 bundles, each done up in 
an elastic band (R. 54 at 12 and 30-31). Another officer later 
searched defendant further and found an additional $1257.00 in 
defendant's front jeans pocket (R. 54 at 62). 
The substances retrieved from defendant's pickup and 
person were analyzed and determined to be marijuana and 
methamphetamine (R. 54 at 74-75). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The initial stop of defendant's vehicle was a proper 
seizure because the officers had specific and articulable reasons 
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to suspect criminal activity. They had served search warrants in 
three of the si x houses in the cul-de-sac and found a 
methamphetanii i ie J ab exp] osive * Is used in making 
methaitiphetamine, and numerous weapons This gave them reasonable 
grounds to stop all vehicles turning into the cul-de-sac and 
ascertain to which fit use each vehicle was goi ng Once the 
officers determined that defendant was going to one of the 
suspect houses, in a vehicle which could have been used to 
transport precursor chemicals, they had _, detain 
defendant and maintain the status quo while there was further 
invest i gation. The Metro Narcotic detectives had outstanding 
warrants for individuals connected wi th tl ieir surveillance of the 
suspect houses, A brief detention of vehicles while the officers 
checked to see i £ the occupants were involved was reasonable. 
After defendant was stopped based on the aDove Lacti-is, 
he tried to reverse his vehicle when the officers identified 
themselves. Thi s acti on, coupled with all of the other factors, 
justified a further detention and cursory search of defendant and 
his vehicle for weapons. 
Defendant has failed to provide any further analysis of 
his claim that the search of his vehicle after the initial stop 
was unlawful. He bases that allegation solely 
the initial stop was i.mlawfu.l Cons . •- • * s LUUIL 
determines that the trial court was correct in concluding that 
the in it id I " was xctwiul, the Court should decline t« address 
the legality :he search o 
The search of defendant himself, and of his clothing, 
was conducted incident to his arrest and was lawful on that 
basis. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INITIAL STOP AND DETENTION OF DEFENDANT 
WAS VALID. 
Defendant first contends that his initial stop and 
detention by the officers was unlawful. In response to 
defendant's motion to suppress, and after a hearing on the 
motion, the trial court signed findings of fact, conclusions of 
law, and an order denying the motion (R. at 21-23; a copy is 
attached as Addendum A). The court found that the officers had 
reasonable suspicion justifying a "temporary seizure" of 
defendant (R. at 22). The court specifically found: 
1. That evidence showing that defendant 
approached the area in a pickup truck, which 
vehicle was consistent with those types used 
to deliver chemicals and supplies to the drug 
laboratory, and the time of day being late in 
the evening hours, which evidence shows is 
the time of choice for customers of drug 
dealers, and defendant's attempts to flee the 
presence of the officers all combined gave 
rise to a reasonable and articulable 
suspiscion [sic] which justified a temporary 
seizure of defendant. 
2. That such a temporary seizure occured 
[sic] when defendant was required to exit his 
truck by the police officers. 
3. That the evidence of guns and other 
weapons habitually associated with drug 
dealers and the presence of weapons actually 
found during the searches of the houses in 
the area provided a reasonable and 
articulable suspicion that the defendant may 
be armed and thus justified the pat-down 
search of defendant's person and the cursory 
search of his truck for weapons. 
(R. at 22). 
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This Court, in State v. Johnson, 771 I-, 2d 3 2ft ('Utah ct. 
APP )i cert. granted, ^ F,2d _ _ (Utah 1989), set out the 
standard for reviewing the adim hK iMlity of evidence in the 
search and seizure context. This Court said: 
In considering the trial court's action in 
denying defendant's motion to suppress, we 
will not disturb its factual evaluation 
unless its findings are clearly erroneous. 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 
1987). The trial judge is in the best 
position to assess the credibility and 
accuracy of the witnesses' divergent 
testimonies. State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 
154-56, (Utah Ct.App.1989); State v. Sierra, 
754 P.2d 972, 974 (Utah Ct.App.1988). 
However, in assessing the trial court's legal 
conclusions based upon its factual findings, 
we afford it no deference but apply a 
"correction of error" standard. Oates v. 
Chavez, 749 P.2d 658, 659 (Utah 1988). 
771 P.2d at 327. Defendant has not challenged the factual 
findings of the trial court, but has challenged the legal 
conclusions drawn tioin those findings. Consequently, this Court 
reviews the matter under the correction of error standard. 
In State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), 
this Court said: 
A seizure within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment occurs only when the officer by 
means of physical force or show of authority 
has in some way restricted the liberty of a 
person. 
73 9 P.2d at 87. As the trial court determined in the present 
case, fU'lpfu was seized when his vehicle was stopped and he 
was not allowed to leave. However, t.hi,- 'temporal y fieizire" or 
detention was valid. 
'T'tie United .States Supreme Court has on several 
occasions explained and refined the law regarding seJ zui HI-, WIIJCJI 
.,9. 
do not rise to the level of a formal arrest. Beginning in Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court addressed the question 
"whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a 
person and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless 
there is probable cause for an arrest." 392 U.S. at 15. The 
Fourth Amendment right is judged by a reasonableness standard: 
For "what the Constitution forbids is not all 
searches and seizures, but unreasonable 
searches and seizures." 
392 U.S. at 9 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 
(I960)). Without retreating from previous holdings that police 
must, whenever practical, obtain prior judicial approval of 
searches and seizures, the Court in Terry dealt with an area of 
police conduct which could not be subjected to warrant procedures 
as a practical matter. 392 U.S. at 20. To assess the 
reasonableness of the police conduct, 
it is necessary "first to focus upon the 
governmental interest which allegedly 
justifies official intrusion upon the 
constitutionally protected interests of the 
private citizen," for there is "no ready test 
for determining reasonableness other than by 
balancing the need to search [or seize] 
against the invasion which the search [or 
seizure] entails." . . . And in justifying 
the particular intrusion the police officer 
must be able to point to specific and 
articulable facts which, taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warrant that intrusion. 
392 U.S. at 20-21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 
523, 534-35 (1967)) (footnote omitted). In assessing whether a 
particular seizure is reasonable, 
it is imperative that the facts be judged 
against an objective standard: would the 
facts available to the officer at the moment 
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of the seizure or the search "warrant a man 
of reasonable caution in the belief" that the 
action taken was appropriate? 
392 at 21-22 (citations omitted). The Court then determined 
ti sei zure and pat down in that case was reasonable in 
light of the minimal intrusion involved balanced aga Ii ist t .1 le 
nature of the governmental interest involved, 392 U.S. at 27. 
Sub sec: Michigan v. Summers/ 452 U.S. 692 
(1981), the Court addressed a situation somewhat similar to the 
present case. In Summers, officers were approaching 3 house to 
execute a search war i: ai it on the premises . On the front steps, 
they encountered Summers, who was later determined to be the 
owner of the house. They requested his help in entering the 
home, then detained turn wtu U1 i hey searched t; he house ami found 
narcotics in the basement. After determining his ownership of 
the house, the officers arrested Summers and searched him, 
finding heroin in his coat pocket. 4h2 1), S -if 6C^, The Court 
stated that "[t]he dispositive question in this case is whether 
the initial detention of respondent violated his constitutional 
right to be secure against an unreasonable seizure of hi: 
person.M 452 U.S. at 894. l 
I n t h e footnote, the Court distinguished this circumstance 
from the search issue raised in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 
(1979). In Ybarra, "no question concerning the legitimacy of the 
detention was raised." 452 U.S. at 696 n. 4. In Summers, "only 
the detention is at issue." ni. Consequently, the search issue 
raised in Ybarra is inapplicable to the detention issue in the 
present case. 
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The Court recognized 
that some seizures significantly less 
intrusive than an arrest have withstood 
scrutiny under the reasonableness standard 
embodied in the Fourth Amendment. In these 
cases the intrusion on the citizen's privacy 
"was so much less severe" than that involved 
in a traditional arrest that "the opposing 
interests in crime prevention and detection 
and in the police officer's safety" could 
support the seizure as reasonable. 
452 U.S. at 697-98 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 
209 (1979)) (citations omitted). Citing a list of their own 
cases which supported detention or seizure on less than probable 
cause, the Court reiterated that 
[t]hese cases recognize that some seizures 
admittedly covered by the Fourth Amendment 
constitute such limited intrusions on the 
personal security of those detained and are 
justified by such substantial law enforcement 
interests that they may be made on less than 
probable cause, so long as police have an 
articulable basis for suspecting criminal 
activity. In these cases, . . . the Court 
was applying the ultimate standard of 
reasonableness embodied in the Fourth 
Amendment. . . . But they demonstrate that 
the exception for limited intrusions that may 
be justified by special law enforcement 
interests is not confined to the momentary, 
on-the-street detention accompanied by a 
frisk for weapons involved in Terry and 
Adams. Therefore, in order to decide whether 
this case is controlled by the general rule, 
it is necessary to examine both the character 
of the official intrusion and its 
justification. 
452 at 699-701 (footnotes omitted). In assessing the 
justification for detaining an individual, "both the law 
enforcement interest and the nature of the 'articulable facts' 
supporting the detention are relevant." 452 U.S. at 702. One 
important law enforcement interest is the prevention of flight. 
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Another interest "of greater importance, is the interest In 
minimizing the risk of harm to the officers." Id. The Court 
determine 
the execution of a warrant to search for 
narcotics is the kind of transaction that ilia] 
give rise to sudden violence or frantic 
efforts to conceal or destroy evidence. The 
risk of harm to both the police and the 
occupants is minimized if the officers 
routinely exercise unquestioned command of 
the situation. . . . 
452 U.S. at 702-703 (footnotes omitted). The Court held that a 
warrant to search for contraband implicitly carried with it the 
authority to detain occupants of the premises whi le the search 
was conducted. 452 U.S. at 705. 
The Court: in Summers also addressed the issue of a 
forcible stop of an individual. 
In upholding the "frisk" employed by the 
officer in [the Terry] case, the Court 
assumed, without explicitly stating, that the 
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit forcible 
stops when the officer has a reasonable 
suspicion that a crime has been or is being 
committed. See 392 U.S., at 32-33, . . . . 
In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. [143, 146 
(1972)] . . ., the Court made explicit what 
was implicit in Terry; 
"A brief stop of a suspicious individual, 
in order to determine his identity or to 
maintain the status quo momentarily while 
obtaining more information, may be most 
reasonable in light of the facts known to 
the officer at the time." 
452 . at D:;O n.7. 
In a case even, more analog 
United States District Court in Indiana found basis in Terry for 
detention c. f an i ud i «, i dun I H\ flu- perimeter of a search area. In 
United States v. Rivera, 738 : .*ph n. md. 1991:1), 
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officers had established a "perimeter" around a house for which 
they had a search warrant. The perimeter was established to 
"secure [the house] so that no one could come in and no one could 
leave while the warrant was being executed." 738 F.Supp. at 
1215. As some of the officers left the house, they saw Rivera, 
the owner of the house, driving up. The officers stopped their 
vehicle near Rivera's and Rivera got out of his pickup, leaving 
the driver's side door open. The officers announced who they 
were and detained Rivera at the rear of his pickup. The officers 
could see a brown paper bag on the floor of the cab of the truck. 
As one officer patted down Rivera, the other approached the open 
door of the pickup and saw that the paper bag, which was 
partially under the driver's seat, was full of money. The money 
was seized and the seizure was upheld by the district court. 738 
F.Supp. at 1214-15. Among the facts adduced at the suppression 
hearing was that: 
[i]t is common procedure for law enforcement 
officers to secure the outside of the 
premises being searched pursuant to a 
warrant. It is also common procedure to 
search an individual before allowing that 
individual to enter the premises while the 
search is being conducted. 
738 F.Supp. at 1215. The district court upheld the stop of 
Rivera under Terry. The court said: 
A Terry stop is a brief investigatory 
detention which allows law enforcement 
personnel the opportunity to either verify or 
dispel their "suspicions that a person has 
been, is, or is about to be engaged in 
criminal activity." . . . To justify a brief 
limited intrusion under Terry, "the officer 
must be able to point to specific and 
articulable facts which, taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, 
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reasonably warrants that intrusion." . . . 
Additionally, due weight must be given to the 
specific reasonable inferences which an 
officer is entitled to draw from the facts in 
light of his experience. . . . To determine 
whether an officer's suspicion of criminal 
activity is reasonable, a court must evaluate 
the totality of the circumstances. . . . 
738 F.Supp. at 1216 (quoting United States v. Boden, 854 F.2d 
983, 992 (7th Cir. 1988)) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 
(1968)) (citations omitted). That the totality of the 
circumstances must be taken into account in determining whether a 
detention is reasonable was explained in United States v. Cortez, 
449 U.S. 411 (1981). The Supreme Court stated: 
[T]he assessment must be based upon all of 
the circumstances. The analysis proceeds 
with various objective observations, 
information from police reports, if such are 
available, and consideration of the modes or 
patterns of operation of certain kinds of 
lawbreakers. From these data, a trained 
officer draws inferences and makes 
deductions—inferences and deductions that 
might well elude an untrained person. 
The process does not deal with hard 
certainties, but with probabilities. . • . 
449 U.S. at 418. 
In Rivera, the court determined that the investigative 
stop was justified from the outset. The court said: 
First, maintaining the safety of the law 
enforcement personnel inside the residence 
conducting the search requires that officers 
securing the outside of the premises take 
steps to insure that no individual who enters 
the residence while the search is being 
conducted while armed with a firearm or any 
other type of weapon. . . • 
Second, many districts have recognized 
that frequently where large quantities of 
narcotics are involved, firearms are also 
present. . . . Here, the actions taken by 
[the officers] in stopping the defendant and 
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patting him down easily fall within the 
bounds of a Terry stop as necessary to 
protect not only their personal safety and 
that of the law enforcement personnel still 
inside the defendant's residence, but also to 
maintain the status quo while seeking more 
information, 
738 F.Supp. at 1217 (citations omitted). 
Protection of the public and of the officers is a valid 
law enforcement concern which, when balanced with the intrusion 
of the seizure, may justify detention of an individual. An 
argument, such as that raised by defendant below, that an 
alternative, less intrusive means might have been used in that 
case, does not make the detention unreasonable. "The fact that 
an investigative stop might, in the abstract, have been 
accomplished by some less intrusive means does not, in and of 
itself, render a stop unreasonable." United States v. Alexander/ 
907 F.2d 269, 273 (2nd Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. 
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-87 (1985)). As the court said in 
Alexander: 
There are no hard and fast rules for 
evaluating the conduct of law enforcement 
agents conducting investigative stops. . . . 
A law enforcement agent, faced with the 
possibility of danger, has a right to take 
reasonable steps to protect himself and an 
obligation to ensure the safety of innocent 
bystanders, regardless of whether probable 
cause to arrest exists. . . . 
907 F.2d at 272 (citations omitted). 
In the case now before this Court, the officers had 
specific and articulable facts which, in the totality of the 
circumstances, justified their stop of defendant's vehicle. The 
officers set up a perimeter to keep anyone from walking into 
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houses being searched (R. 53 at 5-6 and R. 54 at 6). The 
perimeter was set up at the entrance to the street rather than at 
the houses because the street was a dead end cul-de-sac and three 
of the six houses on the street were being searched (R. 53 at 6-8 
and 22 and R. 54 at 6). In addition, there were several vehicles 
and officers involved in the searches, which left no room to 
allow other vehicles into the cul-de-sac to park or to turn 
around (R. 53 at 8 and R. 54 at 6). 
Prior to defendant's arrival, the officers found a 
functional methamphetamine lab in one of the houses searched, 
chemicals for making methamphetamine in another of the houses, 
and numerous weapons in all three of the houses (R. 53 at 11 and 
R. 54 at 6). Some of the officers had received special training 
in drug labs and drug interdiction. In the case of each of the 
houses searched, the officers had conducted surveillance prior to 
obtaining the search warrants (R. 53 at 32-33). The officers 
were aware that the traffic pattern at a drug house would 
normally be a large volume of traffic, with short visits at the 
house. The peak hours for such visits were the hours of 
darkness, usually the late evening hours (R. 53 at 34). 
Methamphetamine labs required the delivery of a variety of 
different chemicals and glassware. The containers for these 
items ranged from fifty pound boxes to one ounce containers (R. 
53 at 35-36). Pickups were often used to deliver the materials, 
and many of the materials were very explosive (R. 53 at 36). 
Most of the time, officers also found many types of weapons when 
searching drug and lab houses (R. 53 at 37). Surveillance of the 
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three houses searched in this instance had shown that the normal 
pattern was seen; there were periods of high traffic volume 
during the evening and late hours (R. 53 at 39). The searches 
had also turned up several types of weapons in all of the houses 
(R. 53 at 39). 
Because of the volatile nature of many of the chemicals 
used in manufacturing methamphetamine, the presence of weapons in 
the houses searched, the possibility that people coming into the 
cul-de-sac would endanger the officers, and the possibility that 
other people for whom arrest warrants had been obtained might 
come to the houses during the search, the Metro officers asked 
the SWAT team to establish a perimeter at the entrance to the 
cul-de-sac (R. 53 at 39-41 and R. 54 at 6 and 19). The SWAT team 
was asked to stop the vehicles and ascertain to which house the 
individual was driving. If it was to a house not involved in the 
search, the individual was escorted to that house (R. 54 at 6). 
If the person indicated one of the suspect houses as his or her 
destination, the SWAT team was to pat the person down and check 
the vehicle for weapons and hold the person until a Metro 
detective arrived to determine if the person was wanted (R. 53 at 
40 and R. 54 at 19). 
When the intrusion on defendant is balanced with the 
law enforcement interests, the detention of defendant was 
reasonable. The factors listed above were specific, articulable 
reasons to stop defendant's truck. When they are coupled with 
the facts that defendant drove a pickup, which could have been 
carrying chemicals for the lab, that defendant looked "panicky or 
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startled," and that defendant tried to place his vehicle in 
reverse when the officers identified themselves, the officers had 
additional individualized, articulable reasons to further detain 
and question defendant after the initial stop. While this Court 
has determined that an attempt to avoid a roadblock, by itself, 
is not sufficient articulable suspicion to stop a vehicle, that 
factor does not stand as the only justification for a stop in the 
present case* See State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 494-95 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). 
Given the totality of the circumstances in the stop of 
defendant, the governmental interest in protecting the officers 
and the public outweighed the intrusion on defendant when he was 
detained while the officers checked his destination and checked 
his person and vehicle for weapons. The articulated reasons for 
suspicion supported the stop of defendant. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT ANALYZED A CHALLENGE TO THE 
SEARCH OF HIS VEHICLE AND HAS WAIVED SUCH A 
CHALLENGE. ONCE DEFENDANT WAS LAWFULLY 
STOPPED, THE OFFICERS COULD PROPERLY PAT DOWN 
DEFENDANT FOR WEAPONS. 
In the headnote to point II in his brief, defendant 
states that the searches of him and his vehicle were invalid 
(Brief of Appellant [hereafter Br. of App.] at 19). However, 
defendant does not provide any legal analysis of a challenge to 
the search of his vehicle. 
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A. Waiver. 
The appellate courts of this state require that a 
defendant support any argument he raises with legal analysis. In 
State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
Since the defendant fails to support this 
argument by any legal analysis or authority, 
we decline to rule on it. 
689 P.2d at 1344. On the issue of the validity of the search of 
his vehicle, defendant has merely stated that issue in the 
headnote to point II of his brief. The body of the point only 
analyzes the validity of the search of defendant's person. 
Consequently, this Court should decline to address the issue of 
the validity of the vehicle search. 
B. Validity of the Search of Defendant. 
Once defendant was lawfully stopped, the officers acted 
reasonably in searching him and his personal effects. Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and its progeny, "permit a reasonable 
search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, 
where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed 
and dangerous individual." 392 U.S. 27. See also Adams v. 
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) ("The Court recognized in 
Terry that the policeman making a reasonable investigatory stop 
should not be denied the opportunity to protect himself from 
attack by a hostile suspect"); State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291, 292 
(Utah 1986). 
The pat down of defendant for weapons prior to his 
arrest was justified under the rule of Terry, Adams, and Roybal 
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that an officer may conduct a pat down of the outer clothing of 
an individual for weapons during an investigatory stop when the 
officer has a reasonable suspicion that the individual is armed 
and dangerous. Roybal, 716 P.2d at 292. Given the reasonable 
suspicion that defendant was connected with one of a group of 
houses which were involved in the manufacture of illegal drugs 
and contained numerous weapons, the pat down of defendant for 
weapons prior to his arrest was proper. Under the circumstances, 
the police had a reasonable suspicion that defendant, whom they 
reasonably suspected of being involved in an enterprise where the 
participants frequently carry weapons, was armed and dangerous. 
Cf. State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, 
J., concurring) (an officer "reasonably could assume that those 
participating in moving large quantities of illegal drugs over 
long distances might be armed to protect themselves from 
2 
criminals who might attempt to 'rip-off a drug dealer"). 
As noted above, defendant has not provided any analysis in 
support of his challenge to the legality of the search of his 
vehicle, and thus the Court should not address that issue. 
However, even if this Court were to address the question of 
whether the police were justified in searching defendant's 
vehicle for weapons prior to his arrest but incident to the 
investigatory stop, that cursory search for weapons was clearly 
permissible under the analysis set forth in Justice Zimmerman's 
concurring opinion in State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1092-93 
(Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). There, Justice 
Zimmerman, joined by Justice Durham, relied on Michigan v. Long, 
463 U.S. 1032 (1983), to justify the limited search of the 
defendant's automobile for weapons incident to an investigatory 
stop of the vehicle. In Long, the Court concluded that a search 
of the 
passenger compartment of an automobile, 
limited to those areas in which a weapon may 
be placed or hidden, is permissible if the 
police officer possesses a reasonable belief 
based on "specific and articulable facts 
which, taken together with the rational 
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As for the search of defendant and his clothing after 
his arrest, it is well settled that a person may be searched 
incident to his arrest for weapons, contraband, or other evidence 
of the commission of a crime. United States v. Robinson, 414 
U.S. 218 (1973); State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1113 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). 
In the present case, the search of defendant and his 
clothing did not occur until after the officers had found 
marijuana in defendant's vehicle.after Detective Huggard saw 
marijuana in defendant's vehicle and placed defendant under 
arrest for possession of a controlled substance (R. 53 at 42 and 
R. 54 at 26-28), he spoke briefly to defendant and then picked up 
a jacket which was lying on the seat of the pickup. He intended 
to give it to defendant to put on because it was cold standing 
next to the pickup (R. 53 at 43 and R. 54 at 29). Defendant told 
the detective that the jacket was his, but before Huggard handed 
it to him, Huggard checked it for weapons (R. 53 at 43 and R. 54 
at 30). He felt a hard object in the upper right pocket which 
he associated with a wallet containing a .22 caliber derringer, 
something he had found in the past. Because of this association 
and his concern that the object might contain a weapon, Detective 
Huggard pulled the object out of the pocket. He found that it 
contained a large sum of money and a bindle of a powdery 
2
 Cont. 
inferences from those facts, reasonably 
warrant" the officer in believing that the 
suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain 
immediate control of weapons. . • . 
463 U.S. at 1049. 
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substance which was later analyzed to be methamphetamine (R. 53 
at 43 and R. 54 at 30-31). This search was appropriate as a 
search incident to arrest. 
After defendant was arrested by Detective Huggard, 
another officer was called to the area of the stop to secure 
defendant and two others who had been arrested. Detective James 
Evans was called from the search to take custody of the three 
individuals and hold them until they could be transported from 
the scene (R. 54 at 60-62). Because he was not the one who had 
arrested and handcuffed defendant, and as a safety precaution, 
Detective Evans searched defendant's person. In defendant's 
front jeans pocket, Evans found $1257.00 (R. 54 at 62). This 
search was also proper as a search incident to arrest. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court correctly 
denied defendant's motion to suppress, and the State respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm defendant's convictions and 
sentences. . 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this c*V day of September, 
1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
^^-^ S^L^o_ 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
'-vy 2#r 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MICHAEL D. STEWARD, 
Defendant• 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 891901609FS 
Honorable Michael R. Murphy 
Defendant Michael D. Steward's Motion to Suppress Evidence 
obtained during the search of his person and vehicle came before 
this Court for a hearing on January 2, 1990, The Honorable Judge 
Michael R. Murphy presided. Defendant Steward being present and 
represented by his counsel, Ray Stoddard, and the State being 
represented by Paul B. Parker, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney, and 
the parties having presented their evidence and arguments and the 
Court being fully advised of the premises thereof, enters its: 
FINDINGS 
1. That on August 20, 1989, Detective Alex Huggard of the 
Metropolitan Narcotics Unit and other officers including Sergeant 
Russell Adair from the Salt Lake City SWAT Team executed a series of 
search warrants upon several houses on a dead end street in Bingham 
Canyon. One of those buildings was found to contain a drug 
laboratory in which methamphatamine drugs were produced. The others 
were belived to be involved in the distribution of controlled 
substances. 
2. That chemicals and equipment used in such a drug, 
laboratory are transported to the laboratory in pickup trucks and 
vans. 
3. -That customers of drug laboratories, and controlled 
substances distributors, frequently use the late evening hours to 
make their purchases from the drug distributors. 
4. That at approximately 11:50 p.m., Sergeant Russell Adair 
and others of the Salt Lake City SWAT Team set up a check point at 
/ 
the entrance to the dead end street in Bingham Canyon. That the 
officers, although wearing military-camouflage type uniforms had 
patches and other police insignia on their uniforms. 
5. That defendant drove onto the dead end street in a 
pickup truck. That as the officers approached defendant's car and 
identified themselves, defendant stopped and quickly tried to back 
out of the street. That once stopped, defendant said he was going 
to one of the houses being searched by police officers. 
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6. That Sergeant Adair and Detective Huggard had already 
found guns and weapons in two of the houses searched on that day. 
That guns and weapons are frequently associated with drug 
trafficking. 
7. That Sergeant Adair asked defendant to step out of the 
car and then conducted a pat-down search of defendant's person. 
That other officers at the same time, searched the cab of the truck 
for weapons. That during the search of the cab of defendant's 
truck, marijuana and other items incriminating defendant were found. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That evidence showing that defendant approached the area 
in a pickup • truck, which vehicle was consistent with those types 
used to deliver chemicals and supplies to the drug laboratory, and 
the time of day being late in the evening hours, which evidence 
shows is the time of choice for customers of drug dealers, and 
defendant's attempts to flee the presence of the officers all 
combined gave rise to a reasonable and articulable suspiscion which 
justified a temporary seizure of defendant. 
2. That such a temporary seizure occured when defendant was 
required to exit his truck by the police officers. 
3. That the evidence of guns and other weapons habitually 
associated with drug dealers and the presence of weapons actually 
found during the searches of the houses in the area provided a 
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendant may be armed 
and thus justified the pat-down search of defendant's person and the 
cursory search of his truck for weapons. 
4. Accordingly evidence obtained during the searches of 
defendant's person and of his vehicle was lawfully obtained. 
Q R P E R 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law it is hereby Ordered that Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
evidence obtained in the searches of his person and vehicle is 
denied. . 
DATED this *T day of January, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
fh^U /?, /I 
The Honorable Michael W. Murphy 
Judge of the Third District Court 
Approved as to form 
and content: 
RAY STODDARD 
Attorney for Defendant 
